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Future Force Development

Assessing the Army’s Cyber Force Structure
John Fernandes, Nicolas Starck, Richard Shmel, Charles Suslowicz, Jan Kallberg, and Todd Arnold

ABSTRACT: The skill and capacity of Army cyber forces have grown in the
decade since their creation. This article focuses on needed structural changes
to the Army’s portion of the Cyber Mission Forces that will enable their
continued growth and maturity since the Army’s past organizational and
structural decisions impose challenges impacting current and future efficiency
and effectiveness. This assessment of the current situation highlights the areas
military leadership must address to allow the Army’s cyber forces to continue
evolving to meet the needs of multi-domain operations.
Keywords: workforce development, task organization, cyberspace operations,
unity of effort, unity of command

T

raining and equipping a new military force capable of conducting
operations in a new domain is an iterative process. The last time the
United States embarked on such an effort was the birth of aviation
units and the emergence of the air domain at the dawn of the twentieth century.
Tactics, force structures, and strategies for utilizing the new capabilities evolved
after the establishment of military aviation but were defined and limited
by the lack of crisis at the time. World War II forced the rapid maturation of
the Air Corps and resulted in the creation of the US Army Air Corps, a
cohesive fighting force designed for the challenges of the air domain.1 Like the
Army Air Corps, the Army’s cyber forces are reaching maturity with tangible
capabilities and operational experience against adversaries and will benefit
from assessing the impacts of prior organizational and personnel decisions in
preparation for multi-domain operations.
A significant and sophisticated intrusion into military networks provided
the impetus for standing up US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and for
cyberspace to join air, sea, land, and space as a warfighting domain. The Army
and the Department of Defense (DoD) have made significant strides to establish

1. Tami Davis Biddle, Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History (Carlisle, PA: US Army War
College Press, 2019), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/378/.
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competence within the domain.2 From a force structure perspective, major
highlights include:

•
•

establishing US Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) in 2010;

•

creating the Cyber Protection Brigade (CPB) in 2014 to house the
defensive force;

•

establishing the 915th Cyberspace Warfare Battalion (CWB) in
2019 for tactical cyberspace electromagnetic activities requirements,
and all Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams; and

•

achieving full operational capability in 2018.

forming an offensive cyber force by creating the 780th Military
Intelligence Brigade (Cyber) in 2011;

On the personnel front, the Army established the Cyber branch in 2014
and integrated electronic warfare in 2018. Recently, the Army formalized the
cyberspace capabilities development officer/warrant officer military occupational
specialties (MOSs) to provide the organic ability to design and create specific
cyberspace capabilities.
From doctrine to training to organization, the branch and the cyber units
have had to identify needs, experiment, and develop solutions to meet the
evolving demands of cyberspace operations. In this article, we examine the
challenges associated with two initial force structure decisions and provide
considerations for overcoming them.
First, when the Army created its cyber units, offensive and defensive
cyber operations were isolated within two distinct and separate brigades. The
historical divide continues with unintended consequences. Despite creating
a new branch and military occupational specialties, the organizational decision to
separate offensive cyber operations (OCO) and defensive cyber operations (DCO)
negatively impacted personnel and resourcing.
Second, these units have complex chains of command with separate
administrative control (ADCON) and operational control (OPCON)
relationships. Currently, the operational command of a cyber team is not
aligned with the team’s administration and leadership, including personnel
ratings, property accountability, Unified Code of Military Justice authority, and
2. William J. Lynn III, “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2010, 97–108, https://www-foreignaffairs-com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/articles/united-states
/2010-09-01/defending-new-domain.
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command itself (for example, a company commander tracks a cyber team’s training
and medical readiness while the team lead is responsible for daily operations).
These complexities cause confusion and consternation and hamper unity of effort.
While these organizational decisions were deliberate and motivated by
operational demands, they hindered unity of effort within the Army’s cyber
forces, imposing organizational and operational costs. Introspection is occurring
across the joint cyber community. With all CMF teams recently achieving full
operational capacity, US Cyber Command is evaluating its current size and
requesting additional teams to be fielded by the Army and Air Force.3 To bring
a more unified approach to cyberspace, the Air Force realigned its internal
components’ structure and composition by redesignating and reassigning several
units under the 67th Cyberspace Wing.4 Now is an ideal time to re-examine the
Army’s internal structures to support cyberspace operations better. The Army
would be remiss to ignore the implications of past decisions made of necessity
without reassessing their effectiveness. We argue the Army must push for greater
unity within the Cyber branch so the organization continues to progress as an
effective fighting force in cyberspace.

Background
The majority of the decade since US Cyber Command and US Army Cyber
Command’s establishment was dedicated to building and training the force. While
the inchoate force stood up teams, designed—and redesigned—training pipelines
for various specialties, and struggled to recruit and retain talent, the forces were in
constant contact.5 The Army’s original concept was to provide 41 teams, and shortly
after that the mandate expanded to include 21 reserve component defensive Cyber
Protection Teams (CPTs) (11 Army National Guard and 10 Army Reserve).6
To meet this immense manning requirement, planners drew soldiers primarily
from the Military Intelligence (MI) and Signal Corps (SC) branches, the two
branches already engaged in offensive and defensive cyber operations. The rapid
3. Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for U.S. Cyber Command and Operations in Cybersopace: Hearings before
the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
US House of Representatives, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116hhrg40605
/CHRG-116hhrg40605.pdf; and Mark Pomerleau, “Cyber Command’s Force Is Growing, in Part, to Support
Space,” FEDSCOOP (website), April 8, 2022, https://www.fedscoop.com/cyber-commands-force-is-growing
-in-part-to-support-space/.
4. Mark Pomerleau, “Air Force Revamps Its Teams for U.S. Cyber Command,” C4ISRNET (website),
September 18, 2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2020/09/18/air-force-revamps-its-teams-for-us-cyber
-command/.
5. Jim Garamone, “Rogers Outlines Cyber Challenges Facing DoD, U.S.,” Department of Defense (website),
September 9, 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/616569/rogers-outlines-cyber
-challenges-facing-dod-us/.
6. Edward Cardon, “2014 Green Book: Army Cyber Command and Second Army,” US Army (website),
September 30, 2014, https://www.army.mil/article/134857/; and US Army Cyber Posture: Hearing before the Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Lieutenant General Paul M.
Nakasone, Commanding General, US Cyber Command), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media
/doc/Nakasone_05-23-17.pdf.
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assembly of personnel into “cyber” units (the branch was not yet approved)
brought the unique attitudes, traditions, and perspectives of the previous branches
to the units. Given the immediate operational necessity created by adversary
activity, personnel assignments and missions aligned with the previous branch’s
mission. Signal Corps soldiers were assigned to the cyber protection brigade, and
intelligence soldiers were assigned to the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade. As a
result, the early incarnations of the branch’s units did not share a common attitude,
mission, or understanding of each other’s capabilities.
Similarly, the Army’s basic manning requirement to field 41 teams placed
immense stress on the entire chain of command of its nascent cyber units.7 The
Army Cyber School, responsible for individual MOS training, was not established
until 2015, so training fell upon the cyber brigades.8 The preponderance of training
still falls on the brigades due to specific training requirements for each cyber work
role—a jointly defined job standard similar to a MOS (we discuss work-roles in
more detail later in the article).
Training and equipping incoming personnel and organizing them into teams
was the brigades’ all-consuming mission. When a team achieved initial operational
capability, it was turned over to its operational command. Once a team achieved
full operational capacity, the ADCON chain of command maintained the team’s
full operational capacity manning and began building the next team. This task
separation enabled the Army chain of command to focus on building teams
while separate operational commands focused on employing the teams. However,
this process crystallized the administrative control and operational control split
into a permanent fixture. The decision to build units aggressively and prioritize
arbitrary checkpoints enabled the Army to achieve required operational
readiness conditions rapidly, but at the expense of developing the most effective
and efficient units.
Ultimately, these organizational challenges—the offensive cyber operations
and defensive cyber operations split and divided chains of command—and the
resulting personnel challenges are a by-product of the herculean effort necessary
to overcome the traditional glacial pace of the Department of Defenseand Army
bureaucracy. However, the cyber force has matured and gained operational

7. Cardon, “Army Cyber Command.”
8. George I. Seffers, “U.S. Army Builds Cyber Branch One Step at a Time,” Signal Magazine, Armed
Forces Communications and Electronics Association, April 1, 2015, https://www.afcea.org/signal-media
/education/us-army-builds-cyber-branch-one-step-time.
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experience, and the situation has changed. The Army must reassess prior decisions
and adjust to meet the force’s and nation’s long-term needs.

Offense and Defense Split
Siloing the force’s offensive and defensive elements created barriers within
the force that are continually being reinforced, including operational and cultural
challenges and impacting the soldiers and civilians who comprise the Army’s
cyberspace forces.
Under the current structure, the Cyber branch has effectively created
specialization in offense or defense roles, with soldiers’ designations determined
by their initial assignment. Once inside the offensive or defensive silo,
personnel cannot easily move between workspaces, discuss missions, or build a
cohesive culture. Personnel in both offensive and defensive units complete a job
qualification record ( JQR) to demonstrate proficiency for a specific work role.
This time-consuming process entails specialized training, requires operational
experience, and introduces a significant organizational cost to transfer between
offense and defense. These artificial barriers foster the incorrect belief that
experience in one form of cyber operation does not translate to the other and
bifurcates the branch.
The centralized selection lists exemplify the reinforcement of this bifurcation.
Individuals selected to lead offensive cyber units primarily have an offensive
background (and military intelligence origin). Defensive units are generally led
by officers with defensive (and Signal Corps) experience. Although introducing
the Assignment Interactive Module (AIM) Marketplace provided increased
autonomy to soldiers, it created another avenue through which a soldier can be
designated as a specific type of cyber soldier. Leaders now have an opportunity
to screen future subordinate leaders for previous experience within a particular
operational facet. While valuable on the surface, this possibility reinforces the
chance of a first assignment determining a soldier’s career path.
Since military operations and the cyberspace domain are complex, specialization
can be beneficial and desirable. However, structural separation between offense
and defensive cyberspace units and operations combined with the inadvertent
individual specialization in defensive or offensive cyber operations creates
potential problems.

84
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Challenges
While the barriers have changed over time, the potential for real or perceived
preferential status exists while two distinct silos exist. Initially, the DCO forces
were built from scratch, while OCO forces could leverage existing, albeit
limited, expertise. The additional accesses, authorities, infrastructure, and
training required for successful offensive cyber operations fostered a feeling
of superiority or preferential status for the units rather than a recognition
of the requirements for successful offensive cyber operations. This perception
is exacerbated by the additional support attached to offensive cyber units (for
example, military intelligence support and developer capacity). This skewed
perspective—of importance, impact, and necessity—can damage morale and result
in dangerous implications for planning and resourcing.
These perceptions regarding superiority and preferential treatment can
have resounding impacts on unit morale, retention, and culture. Consequently,
members of the negatively perceived group (defensive cyber operations) may
attempt to become a member of the positively perceived group (offensive cyber
options) if possible.9 Since mobility between offense and defense has been
relatively constrained, the members of the negatively perceived group may
change their valuation method.10 For example, defensive cyber operations could
redefine their internal value as the total number of missions executed rather than
resources allocated. However, these changes in valuation can increase differences
in culture between defensive and offensive cyber operations. Alternatively, the
negatively perceived group may “activate competitive strategies to achieve a
positive social identity” with the unintended negative outcomes of subgroup
conflict.11 Specialization heightens this perception of conflict and may cause job
dissatisfaction, frustration, and morale problems.12 At the organizational level,
there may be a rise in the promotion of self-interest of the subgroups (defensive
and offensive), along with additional organizational cost to manage where the
subgroups intersect, such as requirements for schoolhouse training, operational
support from ARCYBER or CYBERCOM, or the Army’s requirement process.13
The perspective mentioned above results in the Army’s defensive cyber forces
being unnecessarily deprioritized. Specialized skillsets like capability development
(creating hardware or software solutions) and reverse engineering (deconstructing
9. Samuel Fernández-Salinero and Gabriela Topa, “Intergroup Discrimination as a Predictor of Conflict
within the Same Organization: The Role of Organizational Identity,” European Journal of Investigation in Health,
Psychology and Education 10, no. 1 (May 2019), https://www.mdpi.com/2254-9625/10/1/1.
10. Fernández-Salinero and Topa, “Intergroup Discrimination.”
11. Fernández-Salinero and Topa, “Intergroup Discrimination.”
12. Bernard Oladosu Omisore and Ashimi Rashidat Abiodun, “Organizational Conflicts: Causes, Effects and
Remedies,” International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Services 3, no. 6 (Nov 2014),
https://www.mdpi.com/2254-9625/10/1/1.
13. Omisore and Abiodun, “Organizational Conflicts.”
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an unknown piece of hardware or software to determine how it functions) were
seen as offensive functions and placed in OCO units, even though they are also
critical for effective incident response. Like personnel prioritization impacts
resource allocation, decisions will also be shaped by an environment where the
offense is viewed as superior, more critical, or more challenging. The unintended
personnel and resource implications of the perceptions of offensive and defensive
cyberspace operations work in opposition to the relative restrictions placed on the
conduct of different operations based on legal authorities. Given the potential
global implications, the authority to conduct offensive cyber operations is held
by US Cyber Command, given the appropriate determinations by the National
Command Authority (the president, secretary of defense, or designee).14 By
contrast, a standing authority requires defensive cyber operations be conducted on
the Department of Defense information networks, with authority delegated to the
service-component organizations like Army Cyber Command.15 This requirement
suggests defensive cyber operation should have fewer internal barriers and more
freedom of action. However, even when network owners fully cooperate with a
defensive mission, it can take days or weeks to work through organizational hurdles,
gather resources, and take necessary network actions. Deliberate effort and
attention by commanders are needed to address the inequalities in perception
and resourcing to resolve those issues and their resulting operational harms.
At the individual level, this disparity in treatment feeds myopia across the
branch regarding the capabilities and requirements of different cyberspace
missions. Bright young soldiers are lured to specific units with the promise of
more glamorous offensive work, preventing their exposure to the challenging,
multitudinous, and critical defensive cyber work required across the Army. Failure
to expose officers and noncommissioned officers to the full spectrum of cyberspace
operations feeds a dangerous misconception that advanced understanding is not
portable to different aspects of the cyberspace domain and that the highest levels
of proficiency do not require both perspectives.
Siloing reduces our effectiveness in planning and executing operations by
limiting cross-pollination between the offensive and defensive forces. A critical
tenet of Army planning is that the “enemy has a vote.” This belief is codified in
our doctrine, with the enemy being a mission variable and enemy analysis being
a portion of intelligence preparation of the battlefield and part of paragraph
14. Robert Chesney, “The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations,”
Hoover Working Group on National Security, Technology, and Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 2003 (Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institution, July 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3668463_code119080
.pdf?abstractid=3668463&mirid=1.
15. Center for Strategic Leadership, Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide (Carlisle, PA: US Army War
College,
August
2021),
https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/USACSL/Publications/Strategic_Cyberspace
_Operations_Guide.pdf.
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one of the operations order.16 Soldiers with significant experience in either
offensive or defensive cyber operations can provide unique and critical insights
into the other forms of operation.17 When we look to the field Army, the billets
for cyber officers (17A and 17B) are primarily planner roles down to the brigade
level, where cyber officers will be responsible for planning and integrating
offensive, defensive, and electronic warfare capabilities. An officer whose career
has only exposed them to one facet may not be able to utilize the other two
aspects as effectively.
The partitioning of cyber forces exacerbates problems posed by the small
size of the branch. With a single brigade for both offense and defense, leaders
who stay within those silos can have outsized impacts. Battalion commanders
return as brigade commanders, and their leadership styles, command climates,
and assessments of subordinate leaders endure beyond the typical two-year
command and further reinforce the force’s cultural divide. It becomes less
likely commanders will bring a fresh perspective, and units become more
susceptible to dangerous forms of groupthink. Subordinates who interact
negatively with a leader can anticipate meeting with the leader repeatedly,
creating an environment suited to the establishment of fiefdoms and other
forms of counterproductive leadership.
Considerations for Mitigation
Without deliberate effort, the challenges stemming from the bifurcation
of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities will remain unsolved. While the
Military Intelligence and Signal Corps branch lineages are less immediate, the
resulting latent cultural and functional divisions remain. From senior leaders down
to individuals serving on offensive and defensive teams, we must acknowledge
all these challenges and actively work to minimize their effects. Bridging the
divide may include deliberately seeking the opposite perspective when planning
operations, seeking collaboration opportunities across silos, and conducting leader
professional development programs to expose personnel to the other areas. At
times, it may mean putting unit pride aside to acknowledge the contributions
of the entire force. Professional military education should provide the impetus
for this balanced exposure that is expanded through self-development and the

16. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), The Operations Process, Army Doctrine Publication
(ADP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, July 2019), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a
/ARN18126-ADP_5-0-000-WEB-3.pdf.
17. Chuck Suslowicz, Jan Kallberg, and Todd Arnold, “Government Cyber Breach Shows Need for
Convergence,” C4ISRNET (website), December 28, 2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/12/28
/government-cyber-breach-shows-need-for-convergence/.
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operational domain. Below are three ways to address the challenges through the
Army’s systems.
Enforce Breadth of Assignments for Off icers

Some branches deliberately assign officers across segments of the branch to
increase the understanding of the broader branch. For instance, the Infantry
branch emphasizes officers serving in heavy and light units, while other
branches such as Logistics, Military Intelligence, and the Signal Corps balance
serving in division and brigade combat teams with the branch-specific strategic
units. The Cyber branch must do the same to prevent fracturing the force and
developing senior leaders with little understanding of or experience with entire
portions of the domain. As a whole, the branch must value and promote
breadth of experience. For officers, this training could be accomplished after the
career course, an ideal period to refresh knowledge of the other aspects of the
branch. The Cyber schoolhouse could provide additional specialized training
if required. Similar models are used with branch-detailed personnel and the
Cyber branch’s training for company-grade officers who voluntarily transfer
into the branch.
Determine Appropriate Specialization within the Cyber Force

While there is a need for understanding across offensive and defensive cyber
operations, the existence of work roles and the recent creation of capability
developers indicate specialization is required to establish and grow proficiency. This
need is especially true for enlisted personnel and warrant officers, who are typically
more specialized than commissioned officers. Specialization by mission, however,
may be less appropriate than specialization based on function or technology.
For instance, an expert at attacking Windows systems is probably well suited to
defending Windows systems as opposed to analyzing network traffic in a Linux
environment. Alternatively, soldiers who worked on electronic warfare systems for
four years may be challenged to train their subordinates on host-based forensics as
an NCOIC in a defensive unit.
Within the Signal Corps branch, warrant officers specialize as network
and system engineers (255N and 255A) and within the Cyber branch the new
cyberspace capabilities development MOSs (170D, 17D) are specialized by
technology, not as offense or defense. Determining the proper set and scope
of specializations requires analysis of individual tasks, knowledge, skills, and
behaviors across offense and defense jobs and the increasing billets outside those
units. Integrating job qualification records with existing Army programs, such
as Critical Task Site Selection Board, for entry-level and advanced institutional
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training, individual tasks refinement, and additional skill identifiers or special
qualifications identifier may help the Cyber branch identify and sustain the right
specializations in the correct billets.
Consider Specialized and Integrated Units

The lineage of divided offensive and defensive units is not the only solution.
The 915th Cyberspace Warfare Battalion and the Multi-Domain Task Force
are steps toward more integrated cyber units. Across the Army, units dedicated
to specific functions (such as combat support sustainment battalions) and units
(such as brigade combat teams) integrate multiple functions to provide greater
operational flexibility and internal support. The degree of mission specialization
and the echelon at which to integrate functions is a multifaceted problem
involving tradeoffs and should be based on careful analysis. As the cyberspace
domain continues to mature, leadership should consider specialized and integrated
units to meet the needs of the Army and Joint force.

Divided Chains of Command
Another structural challenge facing the Army’s cyber forces is the complex
chains of command constructed across the branch. At every level, cyber personnel
face disconnected and competing leadership chains with conflicting priorities.
Most cyber forces are assigned to Army Cyber Command, the force provider for
joint and service requirements. Active-duty CMF teams are assigned to one of
the two brigades for administrative control but fall under the operational
control of the Cyber National Mission Force, a combatant command, or a combat
support agency.
Further complicating matters, each brigade is assigned to the two-star
operational headquarters of their mission’s progenitor branch. The Cyber
Protection Brigade is subordinate to the Network Enterprise Technology
Command (a major subordinate command under the administrative control
of Army Cyber Command) and the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade to
the Intelligence and Security Command (a direct reporting unit to the Army’s
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence).18 Within this construct, the command
relationships and responsibilities are often muddled, while support relationships
are rarely used or defined. The persistent separation of administrative and

18. HQDA, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, Army
Regulation (AR) 10-87 (Washington, DC: HQDA, December 11, 2017), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs
/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN2541_AR10-87_WEB_Final.pdf.
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operational control deleteriously affects the Army’s ability to conduct effective
cyberspace operations.
This divided chain of command diverges from the principles of unity of effort
and unity of command and degrades the units’ effectiveness and efficiencies.
Operational and administrative control is split for the detachments/teams
provided to the joint forces and the service-retained units. According to Army
doctrine, “the chain of command assists commanders at all levels to achieve
their primary function of accomplishing the unit’s assigned mission while
caring for personnel and property in their charge.”19 However, the Army cyber
force’s command structure adds complexities to the key command elements and
exacerbates the chain of command’s challenges to serve its function.
Challenges
While units have administrative and operational requirements, they do not
have enough training days to accomplish the requirements placed upon them—
a challenge not unique to cyber forces.20 Commanders, with the help of their staffs,
make decisions and assume risks to balance competing requirements. For the
nonservice retained teams, neither the commander nor the staff has administrative
and operational control, nor are there structural mechanisms to prioritize and
synchronize requirements. This oversight is reflected in resourcing and personnel.
OPCON headquarters plan and direct operations the ADCON headquarters must
fund. ADCON headquarters must also complete borrowed military manpower
tasks that may directly conflict with operational requirements. Formally, no two
headquarters simultaneously exercise the same command relationship on the
unit. However, both headquarters effectively exert tactical control–like control,
violating the principle of unity of command. Company commanders, detachment
commanders/team leads, and battalion/brigade leaders can find ways to overcome
these challenges and make missions happen. Based on individual personalities,
their successes are achieved by overcoming structural impediments rather than
being enabled by structure and processes.
Balancing operational and administrative requirements and having multiple
headquarters imposing requirements is not unique to the Army’s cyber forces.
The scale of requirements, the echelons involved, persistence, and the evolving
nature of cyberspace and the cyber force make it increasingly onerous. This
imbalance manifests in two ways. First, the requirements of the administrative
19. HQDA, Army Command Policy, AR 600-20 (Washington, DC: HQDA, July 2020), https://armypubs
.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30074-AR_600-20-000-WEB-1.pdf.
20. Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2015), https://press.armywarcollege.edu
/monographs/466.
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headquarters exceed personnel support. While some units, like those supporting
the National Security Agency, need only provide an administrative structure
for detached personnel, Army cyber units must provide a mix of administrative
and operational support. Cyber units must conduct individual and collective
training for which the OPCON headquarters may have limited understanding,
responsibility, or capacity. Additionally, the Cyber branch is small and continually
evolving. As a result, the demands by operational forces for the continual
development of capabilities, doctrine, organization, and training often fall to
administrative headquarters. These practical demands exceed the scope and
capacity intended for administrative headquarters and exacerbate the challenges of
balancing requirements.
Second, cyber elements often lack intermediate supporting organizations like
a division or corps staff. Enduring operational control of cyber detachments,
typically led by a major or lieutenant colonel, is given to headquarters at
echelons above corps, like a combatant command, while administrative control
is retained by a brigade. In contrast to units like the 82nd Airborne Division,
which might be operationally aligned to a combatant command, these cyber
detachments lack the usual echelons of staff between a combatant commander
and a detachment. In more typical force structures, these absent echelons would
balance requirements across time and units. Instead, this responsibility falls
to the team leads of cyber detachments with an authorized strength of around
39 personnel, though rarely fully manned, and with minimal redundancy in work
roles. As a result, the persistently aligned detachments have little flexibility in
how they allocate requirements to their personnel without deployment cycles
or reset phases to provide time-based prioritization. Thus, the responsibility
for balancing operational and administrative requirements has devolved to
detachments lacking the capacity to do so, ensuring the problem persists.
This divided chain of command challenges normal Army processes. An
administrative chain of command with no formal role in operations executes
ratings, evaluations, awards, and other administrative processes. Contrary to the
normal application of Army regulations, a line company commander is not the
highest ranking regularly assigned officer. A company may have as many as five
field-grade officers rated by the battalion or brigade commander and operationally
controlled by a completely separate organization.
Soldier issues take on added complexity as the commander is less synchronized
with operational requirements and must coordinate with multiple layers of leaders.
The nuanced interplay of responsibility and authority between team leadership
and company commander complicates the delegation and oversight of command
responsibilities and can result in lieutenants and junior noncommissioned
officers missing key developmental experiences. Supporting and enabling
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functions, already ill-defined for cyberspace, are further complicated by decisions
regarding whether something is an ADCON or OPCON function and the
differing channels for each. Further complicating the situation, most teams are
externally controlled and actively on the mission, so there is no “garrison” time
between deployments to complete ADCON requirements, leaving soldiers pulled
between completing administrative tasks and executing the mission.
Most concerning are the operational challenges these command relationships
impose. First, they can hinder organizational energy. Competing requirements
and nonstandard processes require more communication and reporting and
reduce the availability of personnel for operational requirements. Second, these
relationships can reduce operational integration. Intent varies with commanders,
making disciplined initiative across elements challenging. With convoluted chains
of command, coordination may be slower or not happen because the correct
information did not get to the right person. Since these command relationships
lack support relationships or even full staffs, the command and operations
(S3/G3/J3) channels provide the primary means of communication and often
become overwhelmed. Similarly, it becomes less likely that the person making
decisions and handling prioritization has all the information. This problem
extends beyond the mission cycle into how we build and maintain combat power
in the cyberspace domain.
Considerations for Mitigation
Cyberspace as a domain is constantly evolving, but many of these challenges
are not. Artillery and logistics elements struggle with aligning by function or as
integrated teams. Special forces frequently operate as independent small teams
integrated with other organizations and headquarters with the goal to enable
unity of effort, ultimately a matter of mission command. Commanders across
the Army with complex command structures struggle to solve problems at the
lowest echelon. The principles below can guide how we reassess our current force
structures based on operational experiences to enable mission command in a
modern cyber force.
Embrace the Principles of Unit Integrity

According to the Army’s foundation doctrine for command and control,
“[w]henever possible, commanders should task-organize based on standing
headquarters and habitually associated groups.”21 For instance, if an operation
requires two teams, those teams should be from the same company. This principle
21. HQDA, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, ADP 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
July 2019).
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also applies to administrative tasks, which can reduce reporting requirements and
ensure that nontasked units remain organically capable of accomplishing assigned
missions; simplifying command and control; and reducing duplication, gaps in
effort, and coordination requirements. We can use the command relationships of
organic, assigned, and attached to preserve unit integrity but must carefully assess
the long-term situation and costs to ensure the most effective structure is codified
and unnecessary organizational chaos is not imposed.
Integrate Supporting and Enabling Functions

From property acquisitions to intelligence support, a variety of functions
support cyberspace operations. These functions, however, cannot reside at every
echelon. Instead, a clear process to coordinate and integrate support up and
down echelons must be established. In conjunction with the previously
recommended push toward unit integrity, clearly defined support relationships
will ensure coordination for the gaps and overlaps in requirements.
Systemically Deconflict Requirements

Deployments provide clear transitions that shape unit priorities, distinguishing
between training cycles, conducting operations, and synchronizing readiness
cycles. While physical deployments might not be the right answer, time-based
deconfliction measures (such as “mission windows,” “long range training calendars,”
and “red, amber, green cycles”) could be useful. The mechanism(s) should include
the purpose, be acceptable to ADCON and OPCON, meet readiness and
operational priorities, and clarify the responsibilities of the different headquarters,
including operational support and reporting.
Provide Commander Latitudes in Execution

Unity integrity, clarity on roles and responsibilities, and channels for elevating
support enable unit leaders to operate effectively. Units must also have the
latitude to employ their resources optimally. Combining resources with latitude
in execution, enables decentralized execution and the exercise of disciplined
initiative. The emphasis on purpose in mission orders supports this principle.
Providing units more time to complete requirements allows commanders to
sequence priorities effectively and determine the force levels required to accomplish
a mission, enabling more efficient use of personnel.
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The Path Forward
The Cyber branch has grown in scope since its initiation and has not
adjusted to meet the expanded needs of the Army, which now include
electronic warfare, billets in the multi-domain task forces, billets in corps units
and below, and the 915th Cyberspace Warfare Battalion. Military leadership
should approach the recommendations made with a view toward the long-term
growth of the Cyber branch to prevent repeating past mistakes. The Cyber
branch must develop individuals with electronic-warfare knowledge, skills,
and behaviors, and existing personnel should serve in units and on missions
outside the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Cyber Protection
Brigade. Additionally, the Cyber branch must continue to recruit and
integrate officers from other branches through the voluntary transfer incentive
program. Acknowledging the manifest challenges in the existing cyber
organizations can assist the successful development of the newly established
portions of the branch.
With a broader scope, the potential to mismanage specialization increases.
It becomes less plausible that officers can achieve competency in offensive,
defensive, and electronic warfare mission sets, especially if they become cyber
officers four or more years into their careers. For warrant officers and enlisted
soldiers, growth represents additional specialization. A single billet, or even
a limited number of billets, cannot bring mastery of all branch functions.
Similarly, members of the branch cannot achieve advanced competency without
specialized training and assignment. The branch must carefully consider its
doctrine, organization, and training to ensure sufficient specialization and
mastery while maintaining adequate integration across these specializations to
deliver maximal effects.
The growth in the Cyber branch’s scope will also have implications for the
complex chains of command, introducing additional headquarters and longer
coordination chains. The cyber billets have a relatively low density in the field
Army and provide a limited set of organic capabilities for commanders at those
echelons. Instead, capabilities will often be integrated or assigned from higher
headquarters. Authorities, network ownership and visibility, and MOS density
dictate that this integration must occur with the already complex chains of
commands within Army Cyber Command, the 780th Military Intelligence
Brigade, and the Cyber Protection Brigade. If unresolved, these complexities
will affect combat power. Cyber personnel in noncyber units will duplicate
capabilities available to other echelons or be unable to integrate and mass
sufficient capabilities effectly. A revised modern cyber force structure that
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applies the principles outlined in this article will better equip the Army to
meet the needs of multi-domain operations and beyond.
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